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THE JONES TRESPASS DOCTRINE AND THE
NEED FOR A REASONABLE SOLUTION TO
UNREASONABLE PROTECTION
Geoffrey Corn*
INTRODUCTION
Each day that Houston drivers exit from Interstate 45 to drive
to downtown Houston, they pass an odd sight. Nestled within
some bushes is an encampment of tents.1 This encampment is
very clearly located on public property adjacent to the interstate
highway,2 and equally clearly populated by homeless individuals.
While local police ostensibly tolerate this presence, at least
temporarily, the sight frequently evokes an image in my mind of
a police search of those tents. This thought is especially
prominent on the days I am driving to my law school, South Texas
College of Law Houston, to teach my federal criminal procedure
course.3
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Jones,4 the hypothetical in my mind lead me to contemplate many
factors that would inform the assessment of whether such police
action would qualify as a search. While there is no doubt police
*
Gary A. Kuiper Distinguished Professor of National Security Law, South Texas
College of Law Houston; Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), and formerly Special
Assistant for Law of War Matters and Chief of the Law of War Branch, Office of the Judge
Advocate General, United States Army; Chief of International Law for US Army Europe;
Professor of International and National Security Law at the US Army Judge Advocate
General’s School. A special note of thanks to my research assistant, Elizabeth Marx, South
Texas College of Law Houston.
1. GOOGLE MAPS, 29°46’05.9”N 95°21’52.1”W, [https://perma.cc/WT79-TJ6C] (last
visited Sept. 11, 2020); Eric Braate, Ask 2: Why Are There Growing Homeless Encampments
Under Various Freeways in Our Area?, CLICK 2 HOUSTON (Jan. 27, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/9L29-CQVE].
2. Houston Map Viewer, CITY OF HOUSTON, [https://perma.cc/U9G6-N7PM] (last
visited Sept. 11, 2020) (located in the intersection of interstates 45 and 10).
3. S. TEX. C. OF LAW HOUS., Geoffrey S. Corn, [https://perma.cc/SA4W-ZG7K] (last
visited Sept. 11, 2020).
4. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
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would be “looking” for something, those familiar with Fourth
Amendment analysis would be quick to recognize that “looking”
does not ipso facto qualify as “searching” within the meaning of
that Amendment.5 Instead, it would be necessary to analyze
whether the police intruded upon what the Supreme Court labeled
a reasonable or legitimate “expectation of privacy” when they
were in the process of “looking.”6 And, pursuant to wellestablished jurisprudence, this would, in turn, require assessing
whether the individual who owned the tent manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy and whether that subjective
expectation was one society recognized as legitimate or
“reasonable.”7
While the subjective prong of the assessment seems
relatively straightforward in this hypothetical—the result of the
individual shielding his possessions and activities within the tent
from the public eye—the reasonableness of that expectation
would be a more complicated question.8 Several factors suggest
that an expectation of privacy in such a location is not one society
would recognize as legitimate or reasonable, most notably the
transient nature of the encampment coupled with the fact that it
was emplaced near an interstate highway on public property
ostensibly not designated for such encampments.9
The Jones decision changed this search assessment
equation.10 In Jones, the Supreme Court held that any physical
trespass resulting from an investigatory motive against an
individual’s “houses, papers, and effects”—items falling within
the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s textual protections—
qualified as a search per se.11 As a result, any such trespass
qualifies as a search and triggers the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness requirement, even in situations where before
5. Id. at 408 n.5.
6. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 360-61.
8. Jeremy J. Justice, Do Residents of Multi-Unit Dwellings Have Fourth Amendment
Protections in Their Locked Common Area After Florida v. Jardines Established the
Customary Invitation Standard?, 62 WAYNE L. REV. 305, 329 (2017).
9. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (holding that an individual “may
not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields.”).
10. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404-06.
11. Id. at 404.
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Jones there would be no credible claim of a privacy expectation
society was willing to recognize as legitimate or reasonable.12
Thus, even when chattel property (an individual’s effect) is held
out or exposed to the public, Jones indicated that the Fourth
Amendment protects that effect from any police investigatory
trespass, even one that does not qualify as a seizure.13
Ensuring the Fourth Amendment extends to what it
enumerates, as the Court indicated in Jones, is a logical minimum.
But did the holding create its own illogic? In his concurring
opinion, Justice Alito indicated that the mere trespass on Jones’
vehicle was not, standing alone, sufficient to qualify as a search.14
For Justice Alito, it was the violations of respondent’s reasonable
expectation of privacy resulting from the long-duration and
pervasive monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.15
Specifically, he noted, “[t]he Court’s theory seems to be that the
concept of a search, as originally understood, comprehended any
technical trespass that led to the gathering of evidence, but we
know that this is incorrect.”16 Later, the concurrence noted the
illogic of classifying a trivial trespass as a search:
. . . the Court’s reasoning largely disregards what is really
important (the use of a GPS for the purpose of long-term
tracking) and instead attaches great significance to
something that most would view as relatively minor
(attaching to the bottom of a car a small, light object that
does not interfere in any way with the car’s operation).
Attaching such an object is generally regarded as so trivial
that it does not provide a basis for recovery under modern
tort law.17

The concurrence’s triviality criticism is arguably illustrated
by the Sixth Circuit’s 2019 decision in Taylor v. City of Saginaw,
holding that a parking meter enforcement officer’s “chalking” of
a tire to monitor the time in a parking spot qualifies as a search.18
Chalking a tire, like the hypothetical such as the one I contemplate
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 407.
See id. at 408-11.
Id. at 420-24 (Alito, J., concurring).
Jones, 565 U.S. at 419.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 424-25.
See Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 2019).
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each time I pass by those tents, raise a valid question: has this
resurrection of the Fourth Amendment trespass doctrine gone too
far? Did the Sixth Circuit Court strike the right balance of
interests in Jones, or was the concurrence triviality concern valid?
This Article will explore that question and argue that
redefining the reasonable expectation of privacy test as one that
is residual to the trespass test has opened the door for its own
unreasonable results. More specifically, this Article will propose
that the illogical overbreadth criticized by the Jones concurrence
will necessitate an expansion of qualifications to the resurrected
trespass doctrine: the implied license exception and the noninvestigatory motive exception. Part I of the Article will trace the
demise and resurrection of the trespass doctrine, to include how
that doctrine may evolve to address the difficult question of
investigatory access to an individual’s information.19 Part II of
the Article will outline the impact of subordinating the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard for assessing what is, or perhaps
what is not a search, to the Jones trespass doctrine.20 Part III will
address the potential expanding scope of the trespass doctrine and
how this expansion will challenge the efficacy of law
enforcement and national security investigations.21 Part IV will
propose an approach for reconciling the logic of the reasonable
expectation of privacy doctrine with the trespass doctrine that
could mitigate what seems to be the almost illogical consequences
of the current equation.22
I. BOOTLEGGING, WIRETAPPING, AND
RESURRECTION OF THE PHYSICAL TRESPASS
DOCTRINE
Roy Olmstead, a former Lieutenant in the Seattle Police
Department, built a bootlegging empire in the Pacific
Northwest.23 His downfall came as the result of a federal
19. See infra Part I.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. Daryl C. McClary, Olmstead, Roy (1886-1966), HISTORY LINK (Nov. 13, 2002),
[https://perma.cc/9P27-4EUZ].
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investigation that relied on wiretapping his phone.24 Indeed,
although Olmstead was protected from the Seattle police force as
the result of extensive bribery, federal agents relied heavily on
this relatively modern surveillance technique.25 When Olmstead
faced the consequences of that investigation—federal criminal
prosecution—he revealed his belief that such surveillance ran
afoul of the Fourth Amendment.26 Unfortunately for Olmstead,
his downfall was the partial result of the Supreme Court’s
ultimate decision contradicting this belief.27 This decision
established the touchstone for assessing what qualifies as a Fourth
Amendment search and influenced government authority to
conduct surveillance without implicating the Fourth Amendment
for decades.28 That opinion, Olmstead v. United States,29 upheld
Olmstead’s conviction for various federal offenses related to his
bootlegging activities.30 More specifically, the Court held that
wiretapping his phone line did not implicate Olmstead’s Fourth
Amendment rights, as none of that evidence was obtained by
means of a search within the meaning of that Amendment.31
Trespass, or the absence thereof, was critical to this decision;
because the government never trespassed on Olmstead’s
residence, and never seized any tangible property belonging to
Olmstead, there was no search.32
This decision established what came to be known as the
“trespass” doctrine: a defendant seeking to exclude evidence was
required to establish that government agents engaged in a
physical trespass against his person, home, papers, or effects.33 In
all other situations, police were therefore permitted to engage in
substantial investigatory activities that did not qualify as searches
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.34 Even when
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456-7 (1928).
McClary, supra note 24, at 5.
Id.
See generally Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Id.
See id. at 469.
Id. at 466.
Id.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
Id. at 465.
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doing so intruded into places individuals might expect were
secure or private, the police action did not qualify as a search.35
This all changed when the Court issued its landmark opinion
in Katz v. United States.36 In that case, federal law enforcement
agents utilized a listening device attached to the top of a public
phone booth to listen to Katz as he conversed with another
individual after closing the phone booth door and paying the toll
for the use of the phone.37 Unsurprisingly, the agents did not seek
a warrant to conduct this surveillance;38 why would they?
Pursuant to the Olmstead trespass doctrine, the surveillance could
not qualify as a Fourth Amendment search and was therefore not
subject to the Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.39 Based
on the conversations Katz had while in the phone booth, he was
convicted for transmitting wagering information over interstate
telephone lines and challenged the legality of the wiretap by
asserting that the government surveillance intruded upon his zone
of privacy.40
After refining the issue slightly, the Supreme Court held that
the Olmstead trespass doctrine provided an insufficient
benchmark for the scope of Fourth Amendment protections.41 As
the Court noted, the Fourth Amendment protected “people, not
places.”42 More specifically, the Court held that the Amendment
was intended to protect people in those places where they expect
privacy.43 Olmstead, according to the Court in Katz, was
insufficient to ensure such protection because it restricted the
applicability of the Amendment to only those things and places
enumerated in the Amendment’s text.44
In his seminal concurring opinion, Justice Harlan added
significant flesh to the bones of the majority opinion; his theory
that true benchmark for Fourth Amendment applicability was
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
Id. at 348.
See id. at 356.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 348-49.
Id. at 352-53.
Id. at 351.
See id. at 352.
Id. at 353.
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whether police surveillance intruded into an individual’s
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”45 More specifically, Harlan
noted that:
As the Court’s opinion states, “the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places.” The question, however, is what
protection it affords to those people. Generally, as here, the
answer to that question requires reference to a “place.” My
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior
decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society
is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.” Thus, a man’s
home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects
privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes
to the “plain view” of outsiders are not “protected” because
no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On
the other hand, conversations in the open would not be
protected against being overheard, for the expectation of
privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.46

Harlan then explained the significance of Katz’s efforts to
shield the content of his conversation from the public, and why
that was so significant for extending Fourth Amendment
protection to a place which could not qualify as his “home” or
“effect”:
The critical fact in this case is that “[o]ne who occupies it, [a
telephone booth] shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll
that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume”
that his conversation is not being intercepted. . . . . The point
is not that the booth is “accessible to the public” at other
times, . . . but that it is a temporarily private place whose
momentary occupants’ expectations of freedom from
intrusion are recognized as reasonable.47

Harlan’s approach for assessing a reasonable expectation of
privacy, triggering applicability of Fourth Amendment
protections, was subsequently adopted by a majority of the Court
in its holding in United States v. White.48 In that decision, the
45.
46.
47.
48.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 361.
Id. (citations omitted).
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748 (1971).
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Court rejected the assertion that police violated the Fourth
Amendment when the police recorded White’s conversation with
the consent of the other party to the conversation.49 Unlike Katz,
because White had exposed the content of the conversation to a
false friend, he assumed the risk that it would be made available
to the government.50 But more significantly, the opinion
reinforced the critical touchstone for assessing what qualified as
a reasonable expectation of privacy: whether the “thing” subject
to government surveillance had been voluntarily exposed to the
public or other third parties.51
This Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test was
frequently criticized as circular.52 This is because the subjective
expectation of privacy was inevitably assessed by applying an
objective criterion: had the individual exposed the thing to the
public?53 And the assessment of the objective reasonableness of
a privacy expectation—the question of whether it was one society
was willing to recognize as reasonable—was inherently
subjective in nature: does the presiding judge believe it is an
expectation society recognizes as legitimate?54
Nonetheless, because Katz moved well beyond the trespass
doctrine, Katz extended these protections to many areas that prior
to the decision had been understood as falling outside the scope
of the Amendment.55 For example, subsequent to Katz, a Fourth
Amendment search would occur if a police officer stood on the
49. Id. at 751.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
53. See Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth
Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 122 (2002).
54. Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”: An
Emerging Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1077, 1096 (1987) (“ . . . experience [has]
shown the open-ended Katz test to be judicially unmanageable when applied to container
searches.”); Colb, supra note 54, at 122-23 (critiquing the reasonable expectation of privacy
doctrine as “unstable,” and suggesting that the Court must move towards an honest inquiring
into “whether police have acted in a manner that exposes what would have remained hidden
absent the transgression of a legal or social norm.”); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael
Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 29 (1988)
(asserting that having a reasonable expectation of privacy standard means determining which
expectations are reasonable, which has led the Court to “ . . . produce[] a series of
inconsistent and bizarre results” that do not require the government to intervene when
privacy values are at risk).
55. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739-40 (1979).
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toilet in a public bathroom stall to observe an individual in the
adjacent stall.56 This is because by closing the door to the stall
the individual demonstrated a subjected expectation of privacy,
and it is an expectation the public considers legitimate.57
Accordingly, such police surveillance would amount to an
invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy, meaning a
search.58
But the Katz doctrine was a double-edged sword, for while
it expanded the scope of Fourth Amendment protections to places
and things not enumerated in the text of the Amendment, it also
provided a relatively clear indication of what was not within the
scope of the Amendment’s protections: namely, anything
voluntarily exposed to the public.59 And, pursuant to the second
prong of the Harlan test, even some things an individual sought
to keep from the public eye fell outside the scope of the
Amendment’s protections because a court concluded society was
unwilling to recognize the expectation of privacy as legitimate.60
Examples of the latter situation included the secret possession of
illegal narcotics61 and the activities of an individual who
unlawfully occupied someone else’s property.62
Until 2012, the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test
was generally understood as the exclusive method for assessing
what qualified as a Fourth Amendment search.63 Indeed, in the

56. United States v. White, 809 F.2d 1012, 1015 (8th Cir. 1985).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); United States v. White, 401 U.S.
745, 749 (1971) (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)) (“ . . . for that
amendment affords no protection to ‘a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom
he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.’”); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 743-44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to the third parties.”).
60. White, 401 U.S. at 749; Smith, 422 U.S. at 744-45; Miller v. United States, 425
U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (holding that a bank depositor has no legitimate expectation of privacy
in “information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the
ordinary course of business.”).
61. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983).
62. People v. Antwine, 809 N.W.2d 439, 443 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011).
63. Christopher Totten & James Purdon, A Content Analysis of Post-Jones Federal
Appellate Cases: Implications of Jones for Fourth Amendment Search Law, 20 NEW CRIM.
L. REV. 233, 234 (2017).
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2000 Supreme Court opinion Kyllo v. United States,64 none-other
than Justice Scalia noted that,
On the other hand, the antecedent question whether or not a
Fourth Amendment “search” has occurred is not so simple
under our precedent. The permissibility of ordinary visual
surveillance of a home used to be clear because, well into the
20th century, our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied
to common-law trespass . . . . We have since decoupled
violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights from
trespassory violation of his property . . . . 65

Apparently, however, Justice Scalia’s assertion of a
“decoupling” was overbroad, for in 2012, he would author the
opinion that resurrected the Olmstead trespass doctrine: United
States v. Jones.66
In Jones, police placed a GPS tracking device on the
undercarriage of Jones’ car so that they could track his
movements over an extended period.67 Although they had
originally obtained a warrant authorizing the placement, the
warrant had expired when government agents actually put the
GPS on the undercarriage of the car and began surveillance.68
Jones moved to suppress the tracking records, asserting the nature
and extent of the surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment.69
The trial court, applying the Katz reasonable expectation of
privacy test, denied the motion except for a brief period of time
when the car was in Jones’ garage.70 Jones was convicted and
sentenced to life in prison.71
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the government
argued, perhaps predictably, that neither the placement of the
GPS device, nor the surveillance (with the exception of
information obtained while the car was in the garage with the door
closed), intruded upon Jones’ reasonable expectation of privacy,

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added).
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012).
Id. at 402-03.
Id.
Id. at 403.
Id.
Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.

2020

THE JONES TRESPASS DOCTRINE

541

and therefore never qualified as a search.72 Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion acknowledged as much.73 However, the Court
then substantially recast the relationship between the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine and the physical
trespass doctrine, with no reference to Justice Scalia’s assertion
in Kyllo that the Court had “decoupled” Fourth Amendment
analysis from physical trespass.74 Specifically, the Court noted
that,
The Government contends that the Harlan standard shows
that no search occurred here, since Jones had no “reasonable
expectation of privacy” in the area of the Jeep accessed by
Government agents (its underbody) and in the locations of
the Jeep on the public roads, which were visible to all. But
we need not address the Government’s contentions, because
Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with
the Katz formulation.
At bottom, we must “assur[e]
preservation of that degree of privacy against government
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted.” . . . . As explained, for most of our history the
Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular
concern for government trespass upon the areas (“persons,
houses, papers, and effects”) it enumerates. Katz did not
repudiate that understanding.75

Because government agents physically trespassed on Jones’
car—his chattel property—to emplace the GPS device, the Court
held that the government conducted a search within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.76 And, as reflected in the prior
passage, it was irrelevant that the property was exposed to the
public; the trespass on an item enumerated in the Fourth
Amendment amounted to a search per se with no need to assess
whether the government intruded upon a reasonable expectation
of privacy.77 Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion suggested
the nature of technology might necessitate reconsideration of the
“exposure to the public” touchstone for assessing when an
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 406.
Id.
Id. at 406-09; Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001).
Jones, 565 U.S. at 406-07 (footnote omitted) (internal citation to Kyllo omitted).
Id. at 404.
Id. at 404-07.
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individual loses an expectation of privacy.78 But she clearly
agreed with the majority conclusion that the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test is a supplement to, and not a substitute
for, the physical trespass doctrine. Indeed, her opinion reinforced
the Court’s holding when she noted:
I agree that a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment occurs, at a minimum, “[w]here, as here, the
Government obtains information by physically intruding on
a constitutionally protected area.” . . . . In this case, the
Government installed a Global Positioning System (GPS)
tracking device on respondent Antoine Jones’ Jeep without
a valid warrant and without Jones’ consent, then used that
device to monitor the Jeep’s movements over the course of
four weeks. The Government usurped Jones’ property for
the purpose of conducting surveillance on him, thereby
invading privacy interests long afforded, and undoubtedly
entitled to, Fourth Amendment protection.79

One of the Court’s justifications for resurrecting this trespass
doctrine was simplicity; that unlike the circular and less
predictable Katz reasonable expectation of privacy approach, a
simple assessment of the status of the item and the existence of
physical trespass would indicate a search.80 It may indeed be
quite simple to determine when government agents engage in a
physical trespass.81 But while the Jones opinion seems to indicate
that any such trespass qualifies as a search, analysis may not
actually be so simple. This is because of an additional condition
indicated in an important footnote in the Jones opinion,82 and a
subsequent qualification established in the Court’s first
opportunity to apply the resurrected trespass doctrine.83 Taken
together, this may open the door to outcomes that may tend to
align with the reasonable expectation of privacy assessment that
the trespass doctrine was intended to supersede.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 415-16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 413-14 (citation omitted).
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404-06, 412.
See id.
Id. at 408 n.5.
See infra Part III.
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II. FOOTNOTE 5 AND THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF
INVESTIGATORY MOTIVE?
In footnote 5 of the Jones opinion, the Court appears to have
added an additional requirement for a physical trespass to qualify
as a search: what is best understood as an investigatory motive.84
Specifically, the Court noted that,
The concurrence notes that post-Katz we have explained that
“‘an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to
establish a constitutional violation.’” . . . . That is
undoubtedly true, and undoubtedly irrelevant. . . . Trespass
alone does not qualify, but there must be conjoined with that
what was present here: an attempt to find something or to
obtain information.85

That such an investigatory motive is an essential requirement
for treating a “textual trespass” as a search is reflected in the Sixth
Circuit’s Taylor opinion, which concluded that, “[u]nder Jones,
when governmental invasions are accompanied by physical
intrusions, a search occurs when the government: (1) trespasses
upon a constitutionally protected area, (2) to obtain
information.”86 The court then emphasized that trespass alone
was insufficient to find a Fourth Amendment search, and that,
“once we determine the government has trespassed upon a
constitutionally protected area, we must then determine whether
the trespass was ‘conjoined with . . . an attempt to find something
or to obtain information.’”87
As the Sixth Circuit recognized, not all textual trespasses are
motivated by an effort to find or discover information.88 As a
result, this investigatory motive requirement means that some
physical trespasses are excluded from the scope of the Jones
trespass doctrine because they were not the result of such a
motive.89 But this also raises a difficult question: if motive is an
essential element of the Jones trespass test, does this mean the
84. Jones, 565 U.S. at 408 n.5.
85. Id. (second emphasis added) (citations omitted).
86. Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 332 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Jones, 565
U.S. at 404-05).
87. Id. at 333.
88. Id. at 332-33.
89. Id.
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subjective intent of the officer becomes dispositive? Such an
approach to assessing whether police engaged in a Fourth
Amendment search would be fundamentally inconsistent with the
thread that runs through almost all Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence: compliance with the Amendment is based on an
objective standard.90 Accordingly, what this element almost
certainly requires is an objective motive assessment.91
This is exactly how the Sixth Circuit addressed this element
in Taylor, concluding that:
Neither party disputes that the City uses the chalk marks for
the purpose of identifying vehicles that have been parked in
the same location for a certain period of time. That
information is then used by the City to issue citations. As
the district court aptly noted, “[d]espite the low-tech nature
of the investigative technique . . . , the chalk marks clearly
provided information to Hoskins.” This practice amounts to
an attempt to obtain information under Jones.92

But how should this element be assessed in situations where
the government does dispute the motive for the trespass, or where
the motive is not nearly as objectively obvious? For example,
imagine a police officer walks up to the door of a home, in
response to a 911 call, picks up an item blocking the walkway,
only to realize after the trespass that the item is contraband or
evidence. Would such a trespass qualify as a search? Or perhaps
after entering the home in response to a domestic violence call,
an officer picks up a baseball bat lying on the floor simply to
secure the scene and protect her safety, only to subsequently
observe blood on the bat. Would that qualify as a search?
Unfortunately, what qualifies as an investigatory motive is
far from clear, and Jones offered no criteria for assessing this
question. Sheer logic suggests that most police efforts to “look”
for something would result from an investigatory motive, with
perhaps only incidental discovery of evidence falling outside that
category of police discoveries. But what if, as in the examples
above, the discovery was incidental to a broader investigatory
effort? Nor did Jones provide any guidance on whether such an
90. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1973).
91. See id. at 236 n.7.
92. Taylor, 922 F.3d at 333.
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investigatory motive must be linked to the discovery of evidence
related to a criminal investigation.93 So where should courts look
for guidance to resolve this question? One logical answer would
be to look to one theory of exemption from the normal
warrant/probable cause requirement that predated Jones—the
community caretaking doctrine—and one that followed close on
the heels of Jones, the implied license exemption.94 While there
may be other situations where it is possible to conclude a trespass
was not the product of an investigatory motive, these two
exemption theories provide a logical starting point to better align
the Jones holding with Justice Alito’s overbreadth concern.95
The community caretaking doctrine treats a search as
reasonable if the primary motive is to protect the public from
some danger as opposed to discovery of evidence.96 A similar
rationale allows police to invoke exigent circumstances to
conduct a warrantless entry of a home when they reasonably
believe that some non-criminal threat endangers the occupants
and the person is in need of immediate aid.97 Accordingly, the
essential distinction between these warrantless searches without
probable cause and those subject to the normal warrant/probable
cause requirement is the motive for the search.98 It is logical to
assume that these exceptions survive the resurrection of the
93. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408 n.5 (2012) (Justice Scalia does not
provide that the motive must be linked).
94. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (establishing an exception to
the warrant requirement when a search is executed for the purpose of keeping the community
safe and not motivated by a criminal investigation); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8-10
(2013) (establishing an exception to the warrant requirement when a government actor is
granted an implied license to enter, depending upon the purpose for the entry).
95. See Fabio Arcila, Jr., GPS Tracking Out of Fourth Amendment Dead Ends: United
States v. Jones and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1, 10-11, 59-62 (2012); Cady, 413
U.S. at 441 (noting there are times when a police officer may approach a car for purposes
other than to investigate a violation of criminal statute); Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8 (indicating
an officer may approach a front door of a home just as a visitor might do consistent with
implied social license).
96. See Cady, 413 U.S. at 447-48 (1973) (holding that the warrantless search of an
automobile impounded by police pursuant to an administrative inventory regulation was
reasonable because it was standard police procedure to prevent something dangerous in the
automobile from falling into the wrong hands).
97. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978).
98. See Gregory T. Helding, Stop Hammering Fourth Amendment Rights: Reshaping
the Community Caretaking Exception With the Physical Intrusion Standard, 97 MARQ. L.
REV. 123, 139 (2013); Jardines, 569 U.S. at 10.
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trespass doctrine precisely because their applicability indicates
the absence of the second element of the Jones trespass doctrine:
the investigatory motive. Indeed, in Taylor, although rejected by
the Sixth Circuit, the government invoked the community
caretaking doctrine in an effort to exempt tire chalking from a
Jones trespass.99 According to the court:
Taylor argues that the search was unreasonable because the
City fails to establish an exception to the warrant
requirement. Specifically, Taylor argues that the search at
issue is not covered by the community caretaker exception
and that the City fails to establish that any other exception
applies to their warrantless search. The City responds that,
even if chalking is a search under Jones, the search was
reasonable because there is a reduced expectation of privacy
in an automobile. The City further contends that the search
was subject to the community caretaker exception. We
disagree with the City.100

The opinion suggests that if the government had been able to
persuade the Sixth Circuit Court that the chalking was in fact an
exercise of community caretaking, it would have been treated as
reasonable.101 But if that reasonableness turns on the conclusion
that the police were not motivated by a desire to discover
information or evidence related to criminal activity, then perhaps
the better approach is to simply treat such trespass as falling
outside the scope of a trespass search.
The community caretaking exception is based primarily on
the Supreme Court’s decision in Cady v. Dombrowski.102 That
case involved the inventory search of a vehicle impounded by
police after it was involved in an accident.103 The vehicle was
owned by a police officer, and the specific motivation for the
search of the vehicle was to ensure that the officer’s service
revolver was not left unsecured.104 The Court concluded the
warrantless search of the vehicle was reasonable and that bloody
items found in the trunk while the officer was looking for a
99. Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 331 (6th Cir. 2019).
100. Id. at 333-34.
101. Id. at 336.
102. Id. at 335; Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973).
103. Cady, 413 U.S. at 435-437.
104. Id.
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service revolver were therefore admissible against Dombrowski
when he was subsequently tried for the murder of his brother.105
According to the Court, “[l]ocal police officers . . . frequently
investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of
criminal liability and engage in what . . . may be described as
community caretaking functions . . . .”106 This indicates that
when exercising a community caretaking function, compliance
with the Fourth Amendment is assessed pursuant to a more
flexible test for reasonableness; and that a public safety
motivation for the search is what distinguishes an ‘evidence’
search from a community caretaking search.107
Cady’s more flexible test for assessing reasonableness and
the accordant compliance with the Fourth Amendment is, of
course, predicated on the assumption that the police action
qualified as a search.108 Nothing in the opinion suggested that a
community caretaking motive indicated that there was no
search.109 But Jones seems to open the door to questioning this
underlying assumption.110 By making an investigatory motive an
essential element for a trespass to qualify as a search, might a
community caretaking motive fall outside the scope of that
definition? This would seem to be a logical interpretation of
Jones if what the Court meant was that police must be motivated
to find evidence, or something related to a criminal investigation.
In contrast, a broad reading of Jones would result in the
conclusion that an investigatory motive is established whenever
police are looking for something, even when they are not doing
so as part of a criminal investigation.
It is clear that the community caretaking doctrine impacts the
assessment of reasonableness, not whether police engage in a
search,111 which makes it notable that Jones made no reference to

105. Id. at 449-50.
106. Id. at 441.
107. Taylor, 922 F.3d at 335.
108. See Cady, 413 U.S. at 439, 442.
109. Id. at 441-42, 446-48.
110. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408 n.5 (2012).
111. See Cady, 413 U.S. at 433 (basing the decision on whether or not the search was
reasonable, rather than being based on if there was a search); Jones, 565 U.S. at 400 (basing
the decision on whether or not a search had occurred).
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Cady or the community caretaking doctrine.112 This suggests that
the Jones Court did not perceive its opinion as altering that
doctrine,113 but also supports the assumption that such searches
were conducted pursuant to ‘investigatory motive’. This same
assumption would also reach the emergency aid exception, as
invocation of that exception is predicated on a reasonable belief
that someone is in danger.114 Thus, both situations police will
always be looking for something, albeit not evidence of a crime.
But it is significant that such a broad interpretation of
investigatory motive will inevitably expand the range of police
actions that qualify as searches within the meaning of the Jones
trespass doctrine.115 As a result, Jones may have set the
conditions for an accordant expansion of the underlying rationale
of the community caretaking and emergency aid exceptions and
adoption of an accordant more flexible assessment of
reasonableness.116 In other words, the overbreadth central to
Justice Alito’s concern in Jones may inevitably be offset by a
broadening of situations where warrantless trespass searches are
assessed by balancing the nature of the trespass with the weight
of the government interest.117 Expanding this balancing approach
to assessing Fourth Amendment compliance seems most logical
when the “something” police are looking for is minimally related
to a criminal investigatory motive.118
Assessing compliance with the Fourth Amendment for
searches motivated by an interest other than general crime control
pursuant to a flexible test of reasonableness has been a feature of
Fourth Amendment doctrine since the Supreme Court’s decision
in Camara v. Municipal Court.119 That decision held that such
“administrative searches” fall within the Amendment’s scope, but
112. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
113. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 400 (basing the decision on whether or not a search had
occurred); Cady, 413 U.S. at 433.
114. Helding, supra note 101, at 135.
115. See id. at 163-64.
116. See id. at 134.
117. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 424-25 (Alito, J., concurring); Arcila, supra note 98, at 67;
see also Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967) (applying a balancing test to
determine if a warrantless administrative search was proper).
118. See Arcila, supra note 98, at 67-68.
119. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35 (1967).
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because of the motives for the search do not require a warrant
based on probable cause to be reasonable.120 Instead, Camara121
and its progeny allow for a balancing of individual and
government interests in assessing what qualifies as reasonable in
this context.122 But like the community caretaking exception,
Jones opens the door to arguments that a non-criminal
investigatory motive for administrative searches fall outside the
scope of the trespass doctrine, ostensibly qualified by footnote 5
of that opinion.123
If an investigatory motive is relevant exclusively to the
assessment of what qualifies as a search, then arguably coupling
a textual trespass with an effort to find anything produces a binary
outcome.124 As a result, the investigatory motive element of
Jones would dictate characterizing the activity as a search, but
would play no role in assessing the reasonableness of the
search.125 However, Jones may have produced an ironic effect:
the need to place greater emphasis on the nature of the
investigatory motive in order to offset an illogical textual trespass
overbreadth.126 Why would this be ironic? Because in seeking to
simplify the assessment of what qualifies as a search, Jones has
arguably necessitated expansion of the type of searches falling
outside the scope of the normal warrant/probable cause
requirement but instead subject to a balancing test assessment of
reasonableness that defined the Katz search assessment the Court
relegated to a secondary role.127
As Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in Jones warned,
characterizing a trivial trespass as a search even where police act
pursuant to a criminal investigatory motive risks illogical

120. Id.
121. Id. at 538-39.
122. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594, 601-03 (1981); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972).
123. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408 n.5 (2012).
124. See Gerald S. Reamey, Constitutional Shapeshifting: Giving the Fourth
Amendment Substance in the Technology Driven World of Criminal Investigation, 14 STAN.
J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 230-31 (2018).
125. Id. at 234, 240.
126. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 412-13.
127. See Reamey, supra note 125, at 235-36 (explaining that Jones complicated what
the Katz test could have resolved).
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results.128 Indeed, tire chalking seems like an ideal example of
this concern. Of course, the overbreadth that triggered Justice
Alito’s concern resulted not simply from treating the trespass as
a search, but from the accordant exclusion of the evidence
discovered as a result of the trespass.129 Where the motive for the
trespass is unrelated to a criminal investigatory interest, this
overbreadth seems even more apparent. However, if nature of the
investigatory motive were considered not to only to assess
whether the trespass was a search, but also whether the search was
reasonable under the objective circumstances, it would produce a
different exclusionary result where what the “something” police
were looking for was unrelated to a criminal investigation.130
This would allow the government to use evidence discovered as
the result of such a trespass precisely because the objective facts
indicated that police were not seeking to discover that
evidence.131
Consider the example of individuals compelled to live in a
transient tent encampment. Whether searching such tents—
whether to prevent misuse of government property or to check on
the health of the occupants—falls within the scope of one of the
established exceptions to the warrant and probable cause
requirements is unclear. A restrictive reading of those exceptions
would suggest such a search should be assessed no differently
than a search related to a criminal investigation.132 But if the
motive for such a search is objectively unrelated to the discovery
of evidence, it would support a more expansive application of
these exceptions and the balancing of interests upon which they
are based.133 As a result, Jones would dictate that the trespass on
the tent qualifies as a search, but any contraband discovered as a
result would fall outside the scope of the exclusionary rule.134

128. Jones, 565 U.S. at 424-425 (Alito, J., concurring).
129. Id.
130. See Reamey, supra note 125, at 229-30.
131. Id. at 240.
132. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 371-72 (1959); see also Carrie Leonetti,
Motive and Suspicion: Florida v. Jardines and the Constitutional Right to Protection from
Suspicionless Dragnet Investigations, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 247, 250 n.16. (2016).
133. See Leonetti, supra note 133, at 250 n.16.
134. U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
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Nor would a focus on the trespass motive necessarily
conflict with the Court’s consistent rejection of focusing on an
officer’s subjective state of mind when assessing Fourth
Amendment compliance.135 Motive may very well be a
subjective concept, but as in other contexts of the Fourth
Amendment, it is always been assessed objectively.136 Implicit in
Jones is the assumption that courts will assess the existence of an
investigatory motive by considering the objective facts and
circumstances.137 There is no reason why that assessment cannot
include not only whether police were looking for “something,”
but also why they were looking. Indeed, this type of objective
assessment of motive is already central to the applicability of the
community caretaking and administrative search exceptions.138
Ultimately, it is unlikely the Court would endorse limiting
the Jones trespass search to only those trespasses coupled with a
criminal investigatory motive.139 What seems more likely is the
Court’s willingness to accept an expansion of the balancing
approach central to the community caretaking and administrative
search doctrines to assess compliance with the Fourth
Amendment where the police trespass is motivated by a noncriminal investigatory motive.140 Nonetheless, the Court’s
emphasis in footnote 5141 on the investigatory motive should be
clarified in the context of the existing non-criminal search
jurisprudence.

135. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 736 (2011).
136. See Reamey, supra note 125, at 228-29.
137. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 407-08.
138. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary probablecause Fourth Amendment analysis”); see Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 260 (2007)
(discussing how the California State Supreme Court shifted the objectively manifested intent
of an officer during a traffic stop to a subjective intent test, which the Supreme Court has
repeatedly rejected attempts of introductions of subjectivity into Fourth Amendment
analysis); see Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996) (following Whren in determining
the legal justifications for a police officer’s actions do not invalidate the action taken so long
as the circumstances, when viewed objectively, justify the action taken).
139. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 408 n.5 (the majority does not limits that it must be a
criminal investigatory motive, but merely a motive to find something).
140. See Reamey, supra note 125, at 230.
141. Jones, 565 U.S. at 408 n.5.
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III. COULD “IMPLIED LICENSE” EXTEND TO
CHATTEL EFFECTS?
Shortly after the resurrection of the trespass doctrine
resulting from the Court’s decision in Jones the Supreme Court
decided Florida v. Jardines.142 In that case, police suspected
Jardines of growing marijuana in his home.143 As part of the
investigation, police brought a dog trained to detect narcotics onto
Jardines’ front porch.144 According to the opinion,
As the dog approached Jardines’ front porch, he apparently
sensed one of the odors he had been trained to detect, and
began energetically exploring the area for the strongest point
source of that odor. As Detective Bartelt explained, the dog
“began tracking that airborne odor by . . . tracking back and
forth,” engaging in what is called “bracketing,” “back and
forth, back and forth.” . . . . Detective Bartelt gave the dog
“the full six feet of the leash plus whatever safe distance [he
could] give him” to do this—he testified that he needed to
give the dog “as much distance as I can.” . . . . After sniffing
the base of the front door, the dog sat, which is the trained
behavior upon discovering the odor’s strongest point.
Detective Bartelt then pulled the dog away from the door and
returned to his vehicle. He left the scene after informing
Detective Pedraja that there had been a positive alert for
narcotics.145

Based on this alert, police obtained a warrant to search the
home, which resulted in the discovery and seizure of marijuana
plants.146
Building on Jones, the outcome of the case seemed
deceptively simple: because a police officer trespassed on the
suspect’s home with an investigatory motive, it was an obvious
search.147 Indeed, the Supreme Court held as such.148 And,
because there was no lawful justification for doing so, the fruit
that ultimately grew from that “poison tree”—the narcotics
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Jardines, 569 U.S. at 5-6.
Id. at 11.
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discovered pursuant to the warrant—was inadmissible.149
However, the Court introduced a new component to the Jones
trespass analysis: the potential impact of police acting within the
scope of express or implied social license.150 While ultimately
rejecting the Government’s argument that this is what actually
occurred, the decision created the first qualification to Jones: a
trespass will not qualify as a search when police act within the
scope of such social license.151
This issue arose in response to the assertion that the officer
who brought the dog to Jardines’ porch did nothing more than any
other neighbor might do when he entered the curtilage and went
to the front porch.152 Accordingly, the Court noted that, “[s]ince
the officers’ investigation took place in a constitutionally
protected area, we turn to the question [of] whether it was
accomplished through an unlicensed physical intrusion.”153 This
emphasis on the “unlicensed” physical intrusion seems to indicate
an exception to the Jones trespass rule: a trespass will not qualify
as a Fourth Amendment search if it is within the scope of
customary license.154 More specifically, the Court noted that,
As it is undisputed that the detectives had all four of their
feet and all four of their companion’s firmly planted on the
constitutionally protected extension of Jardines’ home, the
only question is whether he had given his leave (even
implicitly) for them to do so. He had not. “A license may be
implied from the habits of the country,” notwithstanding the
“strict rule of the English common law as to entry upon a
close.” . . . . We have accordingly recognized that “the
knocker on the front door is treated as an invitation or license
to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the home by
solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds.” . . . . This
implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the
home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be
received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.
Complying with the terms of that traditional invitation does
not require fine-grained legal knowledge; it is generally
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See id. at 11-12.
Id. at 8-10.
Id. at 9-10.
Jardines 569 U.S. at 8.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 7-8.
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managed without incident by the Nation’s Girl Scouts and
trick-or-treaters.155

As noted above, this qualification to the trespass doctrine
proved of no value to the Government as the Court concluded the
police officer exceeded the scope of the implied license to
approach the home.156 According to the Court, the officer did
much more than what any other neighbor might do when he
lingered on the porch and allowed his dog to dart back and forth
in search of a scent.157 Nonetheless, by addressing this issue the
Court created a new question: what exactly is a social license and
when will it provide an exception to the Jones trespass
doctrine?158
It may be that this license exception to the Jones trespass
doctrine is strictly limited to allow police to approach the front
door of a home, announce their presence, and wait a brief time for
the occupant to respond.159 But it seems noteworthy that the
Court began its analysis by indicating that the habits of the
country may imply such license.160 Of course the “habit” the
Court emphasized in Jardines was the habit of approaching the
front door to ring the bell.161 But if the key question is societal
“habit” that implicitly tolerates a limited trespass, it could extend
well beyond the facts of Jardines.162
Extending this notion of license beyond the facts of Jardines
might enable the government to assert that some trespasses
against an individual’s effects fall within the scope of an implied
license exception.163 But, ironically, this might also inject the
same type of “legitimate expectation of privacy” analysis into the
search equation that Jones ostensibly superseded. This is because
the license could prove to be a proverbial back door to concluding
society tolerates the trespass because the individual exposed the

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 8 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 5-6.
Jardines, 569 U.S. at 9-10.
See id. at 8.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8-9.
See id. at 9 nn.3-4; see id. at 19, 21 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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thing to routine and acceptable trespass.164 For example, in the
Jardines case, had the officer confined his activity to the limits of
the implied license discussed by the Court, the fact that the officer
did no more than any other citizen was “licensed” to do would
have exempted the trespass from the Fourth Amendment.165 This
conclusion would have been predicated on the determination that
the homeowner exposed the path to the front door of the home to
any other member of the public, so long as the purpose was to
ring the bell and wait a reasonable time for a response.166 While
not framed in terms of expectations of privacy, it is interesting
that this conclusion would turn on an analysis similar to that
applied to determine when an expectation of privacy is or is not
one society recognizes as legitimate.167
This implied license concept may extend to other situations
where police do in fact physically trespass on an individual’s
effects, perhaps even where the police act pursuant to an
investigatory motive.168 Imagine instead of squatting on public
property, a homeowner awakes one morning to see an uninvited
tent erected in her backyard. Police arrive and the property owner
gives consent for them to check the tent and investigate why
someone is trespassing on their property. In so doing, the officer,
after opening the tent, finds contraband inside in plain view. Can
the occupant of the tent—the individual who trespassed to pitch
the tent—assert that by physically touching his tent with an
investigatory motive police committed a Jones trespass,
subjecting the contraband to Fourth Amendment based
exclusion? Such an assertion seems absurd; one that would
certainly fail under pre-Jones reasonable expectation of privacy
analysis. But because Jones indicates that the reasonable
expectation of privacy test is secondary to the textual trespass test,
164. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 21 (Alito, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 9 (majority opinion) (holding that a citizen is implied to have license to
merely knock on the front door but does not have license to “introduc[e] a trained police dog
to explore the area around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence[,]” nor
“explor[e] the front path with a metal detector, or march[] his bloodhound into the garden
before saying hello and asking permission . . . .”).
166. See id. at 8; see id. at 17 (Alito, J., dissenting).
167. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971).
168. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 21 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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it suggests that this analysis may not be invoked to negate or
dilute the textual minimum that led to the resurrection of that
trespass doctrine.
But, might an implied social license provide an alternative
rationale for excluding such a physical trespass from the
definition of a search? Did the officer act within the scope of such
a license based on the trespass to the homeowner’s property and
the subsequent request for assistance? Unless the concept of
social license were extended to such a situation it is difficult to
see how the physical trespass to the tent would not be a search
within the meaning of Jones.
Or, consider how an implied license might influence the
assessment of the police activity addressed in Bond v. United
States.169 In that case, the Supreme Court, applying the
reasonable expectation of privacy test, held that the physical
manipulation of a bus passenger’s bag placed on the overhead
storage shelf constituted a Fourth Amendment search.170 The
Government argued that by placing the bag on the overhead shelf,
the passenger exposed it to public view and therefore had no
legitimate expectation of privacy protecting the bag from police
touching.171 The Court rejected this argument, noting that there
is a material difference between visual observation (suggesting
just looking at the bag would not have been a search) and the
tactile inspection engaged in by the police officer.172
The Court’s analysis in Bond seems aligned with Jones: it
was the physical touching of the chattel property, coupled with an
investigatory motive, that crossed the line from a non-search
visual observation to a Fourth Amendment search.173 However,
according to the opinion, “petitioner concedes that, by placing his
bag in the overhead compartment, he could expect that it would

169. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); see generally Jason W. Eldridge, The
Fourth Amendment: The Privacy of Overhead Luggage Compartments on Commercial
Buses, 27 WM. MICHELL L. R. 2003, 2023-30 (2001) (discussing the Bond decision and the
lack of criteria for determining a reasonable expectation of privacy for luggage in overhead
compartments).
170. Bond, 529 U.S. at 339.
171. Id. at 337.
172. Id. at 337-38.
173. Id. at 337-39.
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be exposed to certain kinds of touching and handling.”174 The
Court then noted,
When a bus passenger places a bag in an overhead bin, he
expects that other passengers or bus employees may move it
for one reason or another. Thus, a bus passenger clearly
expects that his bag may be handled. He does not expect that
other passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of
course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner. 175

Accordingly, it was not the touching per se that constituted
the search, but instead a touching that extended to tactile
manipulation that exceeded the expectation common to
passengers who place bags in such a location.176
Nothing in the Bond Court’s discussion focused on whether
police touching would have been incidental or pursuant to an
investigatory motive.177 Instead, the key consideration seems to
have been whether the touching was or was not consistent with
what the passenger would expect any other passenger to do while
moving or adjusting the bag.178 But Jones suggests this distinction
in the nature of the touching is now irrelevant.179 In contrast,
Jardines may dictate an outcome aligned with Bond when
assessing whether such a touching qualifies as a search by
analyzing whether the nature or extent of the touching fell within
the scope of social license, even assuming an investigatory
motive.180 When a passenger places a bag on an overhead shelf
on a bus, it is implicitly understood that other passengers may
touch it to move it.181 Of course, there is no analogous
implication that other passengers may manipulate it to search the
contours of its contents, and hence what the officer did in Bond
would not fall within the scope of a limited social license.182 But
if all the officer does is touch the bag to move it, and as a result

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 338.
Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-39.
See id.
See Bond, 529 U.S. at 338-39.
See id.
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-05, 409-10 (2012).
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 9 (2013).
Bond, 529 U.S. at 338.
Id. at 338-39.
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detects the presence of contraband, where would this detection
fall within the Jones/Jardines continuum?
This raises an important post-Jardines question: may an
officer engage in such a physical trespass without implicating the
Fourth Amendment? Interestingly, the answer to this question
may itself implicate the officer’s motive. In the Bond context,
this motive to discover evidence no matter the nature or extent of
the touching may itself indicate the trespass is inconsistent with
the social license applicable to other passengers; while they may
touch a bag to move it, they are not doing so in the hopes of
discovering something.183 But the same could have been said for
the hypothetical officer in the Jardines analysis who did nothing
more than enter upon the curtilage to approach the front door and
ring the bell consistent with implied license as nothing in the
Court’s discussion of such action turned on the motive for the
police action.184
Unfortunately, Jardines fails to provide clear guidance on
whether an investigatory motive negates the applicability of the
implied social license exemption.185 At one point in the opinion,
the Court, citing Kentucky v. King, notes that, “a police officer not
armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely
because that is ‘no more than any private citizen might do.’”186
Ostensibly the officer is approaching and knocking because she
seeks to investigate something.187 This suggests that even when
acting pursuant to an investigatory motive, an officer acting
within the scope of implied social license is not engaged in a
Jones trespass search.188 However, later in the opinion the Court
seems to indicate a contrary conclusion when it notes,
[t]he scope of a license—express or implied—is limited not
only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose.
Consent at a traffic stop to an officer’s checking out an
anonymous tip that there is a body in the trunk does not
permit the officer to rummage through the trunk for
narcotics. Here, the background social norms that invite a
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See id; see Jardines, 569 U.S. at 9.
See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8.
See id. at 10.
Id. at 8; Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011).
Jardines, 569 U.S. at 22 (Alito, J. dissenting).
See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 9; King, 563 U.S. at 469.
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visitor to the front door do not invite him there to conduct a
search.189

Thus, the motive for the trespass does seem central to
assessing whether an officer is acting within the scope of implied
social license, suggesting that the mere fact that a trespass is
consistent with how other members of society might trespass is
not dispositive on the question of whether the trespass is or is not
exempted from the Jones doctrine.190 If an investigatory motive
negates the implied license exemption, then any trespass no
matter how trivial would qualify as a search.191
But even this aspect of the opinion creates uncertainty
because it is not clear what the Court means with the phrase “to
conduct a search.”192 The facts of Jardines and the examples the
Court provides (using a metal detector along the path to the front
door or allowing a bloodhound to run through the flower bed
adjacent to the front door193) suggest an effort to discover
evidence. Would this “motive” based nullification of social
license apply when police were looking for something unrelated
to a criminal investigation? For example, what about the police
in Boston going door to door in response to the Boston Marathon
bombing? Clearly these officers were looking for something—
the bombers or other related evidence; but they were not looking
for evidence related to crimes committed by the homeowners.194
Imagine a homeowner opens the door and an officer observes
contraband unrelated to the bombings; detains the homeowner
while she obtains a warrant; and then seizes the evidence. Will
that evidence then be subject to exclusion as the result of a Jones
trespass or will the social license exception apply?
If implied social licenses are nullified only by a criminal
investigatory motive, the Jardines decision might also be relevant
to the legality of police inspections of indigent tent encampments.
Might a court determine that police may act within implied
189. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 9.
190. See id. at 8-9; Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000).
191. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8-9.
192. Id. at 9.
193. Id.
194. Katy Waldman, Can the Police Search My Home for a Bomber?, SLATE (Apr. 19,
2013), [https://perma.cc/9T27-S6QN].
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license to physically trespass on an individual’s chattel property
located in such an encampment? Even if individuals reside in
these tents, it is unlikely that the area immediately surrounding
the tent would qualify as the curtilage of a home, especially where
the tent is pitched on public property not designated for such
use.195 As a result, police need not refrain from inspecting these
public areas merely because individuals pitch their makeshift
homesites on them.196 Furthermore, as the Court emphasized in
Jardines, there is no requirement that police shield their eyes197
from that which is observable from such vantage point.
Accordingly, any information that becomes apparent to an officer
while moving in and about such a homeless encampment would
not be acquired as the result of a Fourth Amendment search.
What becomes more problematic, however, is whether
police may look inside the tents or other makeshift shelters, or
whether they may remove the property from the public area.
Either action would require a physical trespass to an individual’s
effects. From the citizen’s perspective, such action would
certainly qualify as a trespass on “effects” the moment the officer
crossed the line from visual observation to physically touching.198
But would such physical trespass fall within the scope of social
license allowing police to maintain the integrity of public
property?199 If the issue of license relates to the implied authority
of other residents, without consent, to enter someone else’s tent,
the assertion would almost certainly fail.200 Indeed, one of the
reasons individuals erect tents is to establish some level of privacy
from others located in the same area.

195. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6 (defining the curtilage as “the area ‘immediately
surrounding and associated with the home” which is part of the home itself for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180-81 (1984)
(distinguishing that only the curtilage, not neighboring open fields, warrants Fourth
Amendment protections that attach to the home).
196. See Doyle Baker, Annotation, Search and seizure: reasonable expectation of
privacy in tent or campsite, 66 A.L.R.5th 373, § 4 (1999).
197. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7.
198. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-05 (2012).
199. Baker, supra note 197; People v. Thomas, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 610, 613 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995).
200. See generally Carrie Leonetti, The Wild, Wild West: The Right of the Unhoused
to Privacy in Their Encampments, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 399 (2019).
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This hypothetical raises the complicated question of whether
government agents act within the scope of implied license when
inspecting public areas, especially when those areas are not
intended for temporary residential use? And because such police
action may be motivated by a community caretaking function, the
question of implied license becomes even more complex if motive
contributes to the assessment of such license. Certainly, securing
the public from risks in public spaces is a central function of law
enforcement agents.201 And, but-for the erection of these tents,
there would be no restriction on the activities of such agents to
inspect such areas. Thus, if such license exists, it is not the
product of implied consent from the occupant of the tent, but
instead from the scope of traditional government authority to
ensure the safety of public spaces.202
There is very little in the way of jurisprudence indicating the
parameters of such an implied license theory.203 Nonetheless,
extending the Jardines implied license exception to such
situations might produce a more rational balance of interests.204
This is especially true when the primary motive for the trespass is
objectively unrelated to a criminal investigation and where the
scope of any trespass is limited to a cursory observation to rule
public safety risk.205 For example, imagine an officer seeking to
check on the health of individuals in such an encampment during
an unusual cold spell in Houston. Unlike residents of most
northern communities, Houston’s indigent population is generally
poorly equipped to contend with below freezing temperatures.206
Is a police officer checking on the condition of tent occupants
conducting a Fourth Amendment search? Or is she acting within

201. Mary Elisabeth Naumann, The Community Caretaker Doctrine: Yet Another
Fourth Amendment Exception, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 325, 326 (1999).
202. Id. at 339-40; see Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973).
203. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013) (quoting McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127,
136 (1922) (“A license may be implied by the habits of the country.”)). But see Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (relying on Hester for the implied licenses rule but
appeared to be more about “open fields” than the conditions producing an implied license).
204. See supra Part II.
205. Castagna v. Jean, 955 F.3d 211, 220-21 (1st Cir. 2020).
206. Davis Land, As Cold Weather Continues, Advocates Keep Homeless In
Mind, HOUSTON PUBLIC MEDIA (Nov. 14, 2018), [https://perma.cc/8RD6-2S9T].
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the scope of implied license to ensure the safety of individuals in
public areas?
The answer to this question would be decisive in assessing
whether contraband incidentally discovered during such a ‘check’
would be admissible or subject to Fourth Amendment based
exclusion.207 Of course, as noted above, treating such an
inspection as a search would be the first step in assessing
admissibility, and the community caretaking exception might
then apply to render the search reasonable.208 But this predicate
question of search is obviously important in order to decide
whether such an exception is even required. Still, even assuming
arguendo that social license might exempt such inspections from
the scope of the Jones trespass doctrine, it provides only a limited
answer to the question posed herein. This is because it would
only apply to those situations where the police officer’s primary
motive is distinct from discovery of evidence or contraband.209
And, as noted above, that alone may be sufficient to exclude such
inspections from the trespass doctrine.210 But what if police do
seek to discover evidence or contraband?
IV. THE UNREASONABLE CONSEQUENCE OF AN
UNRESTRICTED TRESPASS DOCTRINE
The Jones decision is overt in foreclosing the relevance of
expectations of privacy in relation to police activity that qualifies
as a textual Fourth Amendment trespass. But is this outcome
logical when an individual places chattel property in a location
207. See MIL. R. EVID. 313(a); Of course, the interests of good order and discipline
that impact that exclusion of such inspections from the search category are absent in the
homeless area context. But the expectation that government actors take measures to ensure
health and safety in each respective context is analogous. In the military context, these
inspections are not treated as searches for Fourth Amendment purposes (unless certain
considerations suggest the inspection was a subterfuge for a probable cause search). As a
result, any contraband that comes into plain view during the course of such an inspection is
considered admissible evidence in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding, including trial by
court-martial. See MIL. R. EVID. 316(c).
208. See Megan Pauline Marinos, Breaking and Entering or Community Caretaking?
A Solution to the Overbroad Expansion of the Inventory Search, 22 GEO. MASON U. CIV.
RTS. L. J. 249, 289-90 (2012).
209. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408 n.5 (2012).
210. See supra notes 85-104 and accompanying text.
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where it seems objectively unreasonable to expect that the
property is immune from such physical trespass? Is it reasonable
to vest such property with Fourth Amendment protection based
solely on the fact that it qualifies as a personal effect? Or might
the inherent unreasonableness of the privacy expectation translate
into a conclusion that police may act within implied license to
trespass on the chattel property?
While perhaps purely theoretical, it is nonetheless interesting
to consider how the Court’s decision resurrecting the trespass
doctrine seems to have been influenced by a perceived perversion
of the reasonable expectation of privacy rational: the Court
seemed to believe that a test adopted to expand protection from
government surveillance actually evolved to deny protection
provided by the Fourth Amendment’s text.211 Indeed, this was
precisely the theory relied on by the Government in that case:
because neither the placement of the GPS device on Jones’ car
nor tracking his movements intruded upon a reasonable
expectation of privacy, the government asserted it did not qualify
as a search.212 The Court categorically rejected this argument,
concluding that the physical trespass on his “effect” was a
search.213 And, by characterizing the reasonable expectation of
privacy doctrine as a supplement, and not a substitute214 for the
textual protections of the Amendment, the Court emphasized
what it perceived was illogic: allowing the reasonable expectation
test to open the door to conduct that runs afoul of the
Amendment’s text.215
But did Jones create its own illogic by providing protection
against physical trespass of effects in situations where that
protection seems objectively unjustified? More specifically, is it
logical to subject police to the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment when a physical trespass on an effect can, in no
credible way, appear to invade a privacy expectation society
would view as unacceptable? For example, is it logical to impose
Fourth Amendment constraints on police when the trespass is
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See Jones, 565 U.S. at 406, 410-12.
Id. at 406, 410, 412.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 409.
See id. at 411 n.8.
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consistent with the type of trespass any other member of the
public might commit? Ideally the Jardines license concept216 will
evolve to provide a solution to this potential overbreadth, which
might also align with Justice Alito’s concerns that treating a
trivial physical trespass to chattel property as a search, even if it
reveals nothing.217
Using the example of the trespasser who pitches his tent on
someone else’s property, the illogic of treating a physical
investigatory trespass on the tent as a search because an officer
touches the trespasser’s effect seems self-evident. Pursuant to the
Jones trespass doctrine, the occupant of that tent may now assert
Fourth Amendment protection, as may others whose chattel
property is located in areas where there is really no reasonable
justification to expect a privacy interest.218 And even assuming
the officer is responding to a criminal trespass of the
homeowner’s property, treating the touching of the tent as a
search would mean the officer’s conduct is presumptively
unreasonable, absent a warrant.219 In contrast, this illogical
extension of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment would
have been easily dispensed with, pursuant to the reasonable
expectation of privacy test.220 But according to Jones, this test
becomes irrelevant the moment a trespass occurs on an
individual’s chattel property.221 Perhaps the Jardines license
concept222 will evolve to align the trespass doctrine with inherent
logic. At least such an evolution seems warranted by Justice
Alito’s concerns about treating
It is of course unremarkable that the Fourth Amendment
limits law enforcement efforts to investigate crime and gather
evidence; an inherent consequence of the Amendment from
inception.223 But that consequence, and the exclusionary rule

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2013).
Id. at 18 (Alito, J., dissenting).
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 411 (the officer would be touching the person’s effect).
Id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 406-07 (majority opinion).
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2013).
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 933 n.4 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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created to ensure police compliance with the Amendment,224 has
always been justified by the assumption that the liberty or privacy
interest of the citizen outweighed the public’s interest in efficient
law enforcement. By extending the trespass doctrine to any
textual trespass whenever motivated by an interest of finding
something, the doctrine risks becoming attenuated from this
rationale.225
While Jones forecloses the possibility that the inherent
unreasonableness of a privacy expectation should qualify the
trespass doctrine. Yet it is ironic that if the Jardines implied
license concept is expanded to apply to other situations, courts
may be thrust into the same type of “expectation” assessment
when seeking to assess the existence and scope of such license.226
Indeed, this reasoning was inherent in the Jardines Court’s
conclusion that there is no ‘reason’ to expect police will be
restricted from approaching one’s front door to ring the bell
because such activity falls within the scope of implied license.
This conclusion was based on the Court’s assessment that an
average member of the public implicitly consents to such activity,
which in a sense is a backdoor determination that no person would
consider such conduct an unreasonable invasion of privacy.227 In
other words, assessment of implied social license may turn on an
underlying assessment of the reasonableness of expecting other
members of the public to do exactly what the police did, which
certainly seems reminiscent of the expectation of privacy
analysis.228
Still, it is important to recognize that even if the Jardines
implied license exception to the Jones trespass doctrine were to
extend to other contexts, the burdens associated with any Fourth
Amendment based litigation be materially different than the
traditional expectation of privacy analysis. Unlike the traditional
Katz test, a defendant objecting to government surveillance would
224. Id. at 918-19 (majority opinion); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139-42
(2009) (“. . . [t]he exclusionary rule was crafted to curb police rather than judicial
misconduct”); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
225. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404-05, 408 n.5.
226. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8-9 n.2 (2013).
227. See id.
228. Id.
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have no burden to establish a reasonable expectation of
privacy.229 Instead, pursuant to Jones, any investigatory trespass
directed against a textually protected interest would
presumptively qualify as a Fourth Amendment search.230 Once
that trespass is established, the government would then bear the
burden of establishing that the trespass fell within the scope of an
express or implied social license.231 While the existence of such
license might be supported by evidence that few would expect the
item to be immune from trespass (like a bag in a bus or airplane
overhead), situations to which this social license theory would
apply would ostensibly be far more limited than those in which
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.232 This is because
merely exposing an item to public view would in no way justify
the conclusion of such a license. Thus, the government would
bear the burden of proving far more than the ability of any other
member of the public to observe the item; they would have to
prove that other members of the public were implicitly authorized
to physically trespass on the effect in the same manner as did the
government agent.233 As the Court’s decision in Bond indicates,
even when assessing the reasonableness of an expectation of
privacy, this is not easily satisfied.234
The impact of such a qualification to the Jones trespass
doctrine would concededly be limited mainly to an individual’s
effects, and only when those effects were held out in a manner
clearly within the scope of an implied license allowing limited
trespass.235 This is because it is almost inconceivable that the

229. See id. at 8.
230. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404-05.
231. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8-9.
232. See id.; Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000).
233. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8-9; Bond, 529 U.S. at 338. This would of course raise the
same type of objections of arbitrariness that have traditionally been leveled at the Katz test:
that an ostensible “objective” standard is really nothing more than a subjective judicial
assessment lacking any consistency. But unlike the traditional Katz test, the weight of the
presumptive protection of the textual interest would to a certain extent offset this risk.
Furthermore, a demanding burden for rebuttal could be a component of this qualification.
For example, only where the government establishes by clear and convincing evidence that
the nature of the exposure of the “effect” or “paper” indicates an objectively unreasonable
expectation of privacy would the protection be denied.
234. Bond, 529 U.S. at 336-38.
235. Id. at 337.
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government could demonstrate an implied social license to
trespass on the home or the curtilage of the home that extended
beyond the limited license addressed in Jardines. Indeed, as the
Court has noted, the home has always been regarded as, “the first
among equals”236 for Fourth Amendment analysis. This
maximum or heightened status of the protected nature of the home
was reinforced in the post-Jones decision in Collins v. Virginia.237
In that case the Court rejected application of the auto exception to
the warrant requirement as a justification to trespass upon the
curtilage of a home to search a motorcycle.238 Instead, the Court
held entering upon the curtilage to get to the motorcycle was a
trespass search with no lawful authority. Thus, even when
exposed to the public eye, a trespass onto the curtilage of the
home to access effects qualifies as a search.239
The facts of Jones also provide a useful example of how
limited this qualification could be in practice.240 Unlike the
motorcycle in Collins, the automobile in Jones, subjected to what
the Court held was a Fourth Amendment “trespass” search, was
at the time of the trespass located in a commercial parking lot.241
Thus, approaching the automobile did not qualify as a search in
that situation.242 However, the physical trespass required to place
the GPS device on the undercarriage did.243 Nothing suggested
herein would alter that conclusion. This is because there is
nothing to support an assertion that placing a device on the
undercarriage of a car in a public parking lot falls within the scope
of implied license.
But the same may not be the case for an individual who
“pitches camp” in a public area where such activity is prohibited;
or who trespasses on another person’s property; or whose soft bag
236. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6.
237. Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670 (2018).
238. Id. at 1671.
239. Id. at 1675.
240. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402-03 (2012); United States v. Caira, 833
F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Stimler, 864 F.3d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 2017);
United States v. Neugin, 958 F.3d 924, 933 n.6 (10th Cir. 2020); United States v. MooreBush, 963 F.3d 29, 45 (1st Cir. 2020).
241. Jones, 565 U.S. at 403; Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1667.
242. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
243. Id. at 404.
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is touched in a plane’s overhead compartment while being moved.
In these situations, the Government should be afforded the
opportunity to demonstrate that the trespass was consistent with
implied license, and to do so the Government will almost
certainly emphasize the inherent unreasonableness of the
expectation that the chattel property will be immune from such
trespass precisely because other members of the public may do
what the police officer did.244 If the individual citizen benefits
from a presumption of protection, with an accordant demanding
burden placed on the Government to establish exemption from
this trespass-triggered presumption, a more logical balance will
emerge rather than the per se rule adopted in Jones.245
244. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2013).
245. There is another looming reason why it is important to consider whether the
trespass trigger for Fourth Amendment protections should be subject to this type of
qualification: the impact on electronic data. As noted in Jones and reinforced in Jardines,
the trespass doctrine is limited to those items enumerated in the text of the Fourth
Amendment. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 n.8 (2012); see also Jardines,
569 U.S. at 5. To date, this does not include electronic data. But the Court’s jurisprudence,
coupled with the increasingly pervasive role of data in our day-to-day lives, suggests that the
treatment of electronic data as the modern-day analogue to “papers” within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment may not be far off. Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion in United
States v. Carpenter may have been the opening salvo for such an evolution. See United
States v. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). In that case, the Court
held that government access to cell-site location data qualified as a search. Id. at 2220
(majority opinion). The majority reached this decision by applying the reasonable
expectation of privacy test. Id. at 2217. According to the Court, the relatively involuntary
nature of how such data is shared coupled with the pervasiveness of the location information
it provides were enough to rebut the third-party doctrine and establish a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Id.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Gorsuch explained why he believed the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test was a fundamentally flawed touchstone for Fourth Amendment
protections. Id. at 2265 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Like the criticisms frequently proffered
by Justice Scalia, Gorsuch focused on the arbitrariness of the test. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at
2265 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting). This arbitrariness was, according to his opinion, on full
display in the majority holding and reasoning. Id. at 2266-67. As he noted, the lower courts
had properly applied the Katz test coupled with the third-party doctrine qualifier: because
Carpenter’s cell site date was shared with a third party, that qualifier “snuf[fed] out” his
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 2267-78 (citing Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S.
56 (1992)). However, unlike the lower Courts, the majority adopted a new qualifier to the
qualifier, concluding that even though the data had been shared with a third-party, Carpenter
still retained a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 2217 (majority opinion).For Justice
Gorsuch, the majority approach only added a new layer of complication to the Katz test. See
id. at 2267 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). For him, a much simpler answer seemed apparent: a
textual approach. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267-68 (Gorsuch, J. dissenting). After
criticizing the third-party doctrine as inconsistent with actual societal views on the protection
of privacy, Gorsuch suggested that treating data as the modern-day analogue of Fourth
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Amendment papers offered a solution that was both more coherent and consistent with the
essence of the Amendment. Id. at 2268. First, in rejecting the underlying rational for the
third-party doctrine, Gorsuch hinted at the textual trespass alternative: “Just because you
entrust your data—in some cases, your modern-day papers and effects—to a third party may
not mean you lose any Fourth Amendment interest in its contents.” Id. at 2269 (emphasis
added). Then later in his opinion he indicated that, “It seems to me entirely possible a
person’s cell-site data could qualify as his papers or effects under existing law.” Id. at 2272
(second emphasis added).Justice Gorsuch’s suggestion that data be treated as “papers” for
Fourth Amendment purposes may be the first salvo in a barrage that will bring this approach
from the realm of a dissent into that of a holding. Id. Indeed, the Court’s increasingly
protective treatment of data suggests it is moving in just such a direction. Cases like
Carpenter and Riley v. California, as well as several of the concurring opinions in Jones,
indicate a substantial concern that the pervasive use of data necessitate a new approach to its
protection. See generally Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219-20 (majority opinion); see also Riley
v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385-86 (2014); Jones, 565 U.S. at 416-17 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); Jones, 565 U.S. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring). To this end, it seems significant
that it was this aspect of Jones that the Carpenter majority relied on to bolster the Court’s
holding.
Enhancing protection for electronic data shared with third parties was a thread that connected
the Carpenter majority with Justice Gorsuch. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. For the
majority, this necessitated a qualification to the third-party doctrine; for Justice Gorsuch, a
better solution was a new approach to the characterization of data. Id. at 2268-71 (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting). Many would agree that the concern for the protection of data is both logical
and necessary. But if data were to be treated as “papers,” the Jones trespass doctrine might
produce an overbreadth that is just as troubling as the pervasive exposure of data to
government surveillance pursuant to the third-party doctrine. See id. If a trespass on that
data qualifies as a Fourth Amendment search, then arguably, no matter how widely exposed
to the public that data may be, law enforcement agents would be prohibited from accessing
and seizing that data unless they comply with the Fourth Amendment. See generally Jones,
565 U.S. at 410 n.7.Such an application of the trespass doctrine seems as illogical as a claim
of Fourth Amendment protection for a tent pitched on a neighbor’s property without consent.
When data is shared not only with the entity providing the storage service, but with the public
generally, there seems little justification for treating government access of that data as a
search. Id. at 409-10. However, if treated as an analogue to papers for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment, accessing and taking control of that data might qualify as the type of physical
trespass implicating the Jones doctrine. See id. at 407-08.It may be tempting to consider
application of the plain view doctrine as a solution to this potential protective overbreadth.
After all, once shared with the public, data would be just as easily observed by government
agents. But Jones establishes that an investigatory trespass is to be treated as a search, and
not a seizure. See id. at 408-09. Accordingly, it is irrelevant whether the “thing” being
trespassed against has been exposed to the public. See id. Indeed, this is exactly the argument
proffered by the government in Jones, and rejected by the Court: it was irrelevant that police
accessed Jones’ car in a public place when the placed the GPS device on the car because it
was the trespassory placement, and not the access, that qualified as a search. Jones, 565 U.S.
at 410. Because the plain view doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement for a
seizure, and in no way renders a search reasonable, it provided no justification for that
trespass. Id. at 410 n.7. Gaining access to electronic data fully exposed to the public would
arguably implicate the same analysis, resulting in the conclusion that it is the trespassory
access, and not the seizure, that would implicate the Fourth Amendment. See id.
In the alternative, the protection from trespass against data were treated as presumptive
instead of conclusive, a more rational balance of interests would be advanced. Like the
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CONCLUSION
Resurrecting the physical trespass test for assessing when
government action qualifies as a Fourth Amendment search
substantially expanded the range of investigatory actions
subjected to the Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. By
relegating the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test to a
supplemental role, the Court sought to ensure what it concluded
was the minimum protection provided by the text of the
Amendment was not diluted by a test developed to enhance the
scope of that protection.246 However, in seeking to prevent
“unreasonable” outcomes resulting from application of the
reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine, the Court may have
set the conditions for a different type of unreasonable protective
overbreadth, especially with regard to an individual’s “effects.”247
Now that the mere physical touching of such effects in the course
of an investigation qualifies as a search, it means that such
touching triggers the requirements of the Fourth Amendment
even when it in no way would be perceived as intruding on a
reasonable expectation of privacy.248
The potential protective overbreadth of this resurrected
trespass doctrine is reflected in cases involving the type of trivial
physical trespass involved in “chalking” a car tire.249 This risk of
illogic overbreadth may lead the Court to search for openings to
trespass against chattel property, the government would be provided the opportunity to
establish that the access to the data was consistent with implied license because the
government did no more than any other member of the public might do. See Jardines, 569
U.S. at 8. As Justice Gorsuch notes in his Carpenter dissent, when the government obtains
data from a third-party repository, objective analysis suggests that data should fall within the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2262-63 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting). This is because the individual entrusting the data to the third-party rarely expect
the third-party to disclose that data to others and certainly would not expect other individuals
unassociated with the third-party to access that data. Id. However, the situation is quite
different when the individual exposes the data to the general public. In such situations, the
exposure provides an objective touchstone for concluding access to the data falls within the
scope of implied license. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 7-9. In short, so long as the government
does nothing more to obtain the data than any other member of the public could do, it should
not qualify as a search, even if the government must engage in what amounts to a physical
trespass to obtain the data. See id. at 8.
246. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 408-09.
247. See id. at 411 n.8.
248. See id. at 424-25 (Alito, J., concurring).
249. Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 332-33 (6th Cir. 2019).
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qualify to scope of the doctrine. Two seeds for such qualifications
may have already been planted: the investigatory motive element
of Jones and the implied social license concept addressed in
Jardines.250 How this doctrine will ultimately evolve is yet to be
seen. Perhaps cases like Taylor will now be the norm, requiring
law enforcement agents to obtain a warrant or identify a relevant
exception whenever they lay their hands on a suspect’s chattel
property.251 Or perhaps the Court will indeed search for a more
logical alignment between the physical trespass doctrine and the
reasonable expectation doctrine? If it chooses to do so, the seeds
it has planted should provide the opportunity.

250. See Jardines, 569 U.S. at 8.
251. See Taylor, 922 F.3d at 332-33.

